

The *Predication-Model* as a component of a Semantic and Pragmatic
Content-Analysis¹

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1. The frame of the problem

The linguistic background of the problem I want to deal with is the dependency-grammar or *Valenzgrammatik*.² The aim of such a concept consists in describing the literal meaning of a sentence departing from the "predicate" as the kernel of a sentence and adding the further nominal elements, well defined in semantic terminology, which are dependent on the predicate. Thus "meaning" is understood as a structure of a limited number of terms, the arrangement of which changes from one meaning (=semem) to the next. It is possible, then, to describe the whole of a sentence or better: the complete act of a predication³ by the following terms:

1.actant |P| 2.actant 3.actant topology chronology⁴

In a short contribution (1986), I tried to outline such a dependency-grammar embedded in a concept of text-description within the trichotomy of "syntax - semantics - pragmatics".

¹ This manuscript has been written by the TUSTEP-software, developed at the University of Tübingen.

² There are to be recalled the names of L. TESNIERE, Ch. FILLMORE (generative-semantics), W. RICHTER and my own publications from (1981) (1986BTV), with beginnings in (1974).

³ That means the "proposition" except for the fields of "modality" and "illocution", which have to be described separately.

⁴ Short definitions: 1.actant = subject in traditional; it can be subdivided into a dynamic (description of a development: ingressive vs. resultative) or into a static category (the two elements of a sentence of identification). - 2. actant = object; the 2. actant can also be modified: meanings of a predicate under the headline of "transformation" require a beginning object and a resultant object (then called "effect"). - 3. actant = addressee or deficient; i.e. the person who gets or who loses something. - The deictic categories "topology" and "chronology" are always questioned because they represent the fundamental presupposition of our thinking: man only may think and speak *within* the coordinates of time and space (and only by means of an artificial abstraction, he gives the impression that he utters truths on a timeless and spaceless i.e. eternal level).

In (1987)⁵, I mainly concentrated on the description of the problem of "actants and nominals".

Now I want to talk about a further element of a phrase, of a proposition, the most important element: **[P]** = Predicate. Usually, in colloquial speech, the predicate⁶ is identified with the verb.⁷ This is wrong as we can see by the existence of nominal phrases in many languages.⁸ In these cases, we are accustomed to identify the second nominal element as "predicate". - I want to show here that this is wrong, too.⁹

2. Philosophical background

The problem we have to deal with has a long tradition in the area

⁵ To be published in 1988.

⁶ Cf. the description of the predicates of psalm 46: SCHWEIZER, H (1986ThQ).

⁷ "Die scheinbar einfache Aufgabe, welche von jedem Volksschüler verlangt wird, das Prädikat in einem Satz zu erkennen, ist also gar nicht so einfach und auch mit Hilfe der Duden-Grammatik nicht immer zweifelsfrei zu lösen", SCHRODT, R (1984) 415; after a detailed historical survey, SCHRODT concludes: "es scheint, nach den divergenten grammatischen Darstellungen zu urteilen, eine allgemein akzeptable Lösung nicht in Sicht" (439). - "In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, however, we will introduce the term *predicator** to bear this rather different sense of 'predicate'", LYONS, J (1978) 434.

⁸ Anyway, we have to proceed in this question from the surface-level to the semantic level, from the sentence to the proposition, because we do not refer to the *words* uttered, when we call an utterance as true or as false, but we refer to the *meaning* of the words, cf. TUGENDHAT, WOLF (1983) 26.92-94.

⁹ FREUNDLICH, R (1972) 7 distinguishes not only between subject (= that, about which something is said) and the predicate (= that, what is said about something). Moreover he sees two elements in the predicate: a certain *content* and a certain *relation* between subject and content. By that semantical and logical definition up to now nothing is said about the way, subject and predicate appear on the surface-level of the language (in a verbal or nominal sentence; with or without modality markers; with or without copula etc.). Looking at the predicate, we, therefore, have to answer two questions: (1) By what *content* is the subject described? (2) What is the *relation* between the subject and that content? Cf. RIES, J (1931) 104: "doppelte Aufgabe" of the predicate.

of philosophy.¹⁰ It is not my task here to recall you all the propositions of the important philosophers about "proposition"... Instead, I am only interested in the following questions: What is the difference between "notion" and "phrase",¹¹ between "notion" and "nominal word-group"? Furthermore,¹² if you concede that both, "phrase" and "nominal word-group" are complex entities: By which means are such simple entities bound together to a complex entity? In philosophy, the act of binding together is called "predication", the result i.e. "proposition" or "statement" or "judgment".¹³

¹⁰ TESNIERE, L (1965) refuses each influence of philosophical logic. In a contemptuous sense he writes: "Se fondant sur des principes **logiques** la grammaire traditionnelle s'efforce de retrouver dans la phrase l'opposition **logique** entre le **sujet** et le **prédicat**... ..la **logique formelle a priori** qui n'a rien à voir en linguistique"(103s). The main argument against logic is a morphological observation: In the latin phrase *filius amat patrem* "La **coupure entre le sujet et le prédicat** n'est donc pas marquée par une coupure de mots"(104). But this only proves that morphological structure (on the surface-level) and logical structure (on the semantic level) are not in a one-to-one-relation, - a banal linguistic insight. Therefore, it is not by chance that T. is unable to describe "la phrase substantivale" (cf. ch.73). He is fixed upon "le nœud verbal". - "Angesichts der Gewißheit, mit der Tesnière diesen Glaubenssatz der modernen Sprachwissenschaft vorträgt (i.e. opposition against formal logic, H.S.), ist es erstaunlich zu sehen, in welchem Ausmaß die valenztheoretische Interpretation des Satzes mit seiner Darstellung in der modernen Formallogik übereinstimmt", ZIEGLER, J (1984) 95.

¹¹ "Ein Urteil ist dadurch von einem 'bloßen' Gedanken unterschieden, daß *behauptet* wird, der Gedanke sei wahr oder falsch. Erst im Urteil konstituiert sich die Erfahrung der 'wirklichen Welt', aber eben als Urteil über die Wahrheit oder Falschheit von *Gedanken*. Ein Urteil ist also eine *Wahrheitsfunktion*. Es erstellt eine Zuordnung zwischen einem Gedanken und einem der beiden Wahrheitswerte. Im Urteil wird behauptet, daß ein Gedanke wahr oder daß er falsch sei; im Urteil vollziehen wir den Schritt von den *Wahrheitsbedingungen* zum *Wahrheitswert*", MEYER, M (1976) 39f.

¹² We exclude here such semantic/pragmatic fields as: modality, negation, implication/presupposition, speech-acts, truth-values.

¹³ For a long time, philosophers did not differentiate between "speech-act" and "proposition". Therefore, we meet confusions. Does "statement" - questioned out of a linguistic theory - mean a speech-act in spoken language or a logical operation which still needs to be performed in a certain speech-act?

3. Our project

My concern here is to discuss and to illustrate a model which enables us to describe the binding together, mentioned above, on different levels. One logical structure called "predication-model" is able to explain the binding together of simple contents (notions) in order to form a complex statement or proposition.¹⁴ If that structure is to be verified, then we shall have several advantages in our content-analysis:

- firstly: our description fits in logical insights of general philosophy; this helps us to convince each other of the results of our understanding of the biblical text;
- secondly: it will not be necessary - at least in this field - to argue with esoteric mysteries of the Hebrew language;
- thirdly: the reapplication of the same logical structure on several linguistic levels gives our analysis a high degree of transparency because of its economy in terminology;
- fourthly: programming on this philosophical ground becomes rather easy despite the fact that one has to be aware of the different and interwoven levels of a descriptive linguistic procedure. But complexity, then, is not a synonym to mystery ...

4. Terminology

As a result of philosophical insights¹⁵ and linguistic discussion¹⁶, we can emphasize two points:

(1) Each statement contains *three* elements: something, *about* which something is said (= subject); something which says something about the subject (= content *b*); and the relation between the two contents (= functor), a relation whose effect it is to change the

¹⁴ Phrases, which formulate the "existence" of something are excluded here because they offer special problems. Existential statements ought to be treated separately; cf. SCHWEIZER, H (1981) 97f.122f; (1986) 50.103; MENNE, A (1959).

¹⁵ In addition cf. FLACH, W (1974) who confirms the trichotomy of the elements (like R. FREUNDLICH).

¹⁶ In addition cf. REICHENBACH, H (1948) §17.

first named separate contents into a unity, to transform them into a statement. The logical form of each statement: $f(a,b)$.¹⁷

(2) This basic formula may be differentiated looking at the characteristics of a and b . And so it is possible to differentiate f . But all the following examples, specifications,¹⁸ lie within the main frame: $f(a,b)$.

I want to contend, that this relation $f(a,b)$ (or to put it in traditional terminology: the relation between subject and predicate) is of fundamental nature, anterior to all other relations in a phrase. Therefore e.g., we regard an additional 2.actant (= *object*) or 3.actant (= *addressee* and/or *deficient*) as dependent from the content b . There are many meanings, which request further actants. But their relation to content b is not of the same range as in the case: $f(a,b)$.

¹⁷ ZIEGLER, J (1984) 120: "Subjektsausdruck und Prädikatsausdruck sind Konstruktion des je relevanten, d.h. dem Gegenstand adäquaten Begriffs, des je relevanten Subjektsbegriffs und des je relevanten Prädikatsbegriffs... Frage, worin die *Einheit* des Satzes selbst zum Ausdruck kommt(122)... Es ist dies die Idee, den urteilsstiftenden Funktor als reines 'Formwort' darzustellen, als Zeicheneinheit, die keinerlei gegenständliche Bedeutung hat und deren einziger Sinn darin besteht, andere Zeicheneinheiten zur Einheit des Satzes zu verbinden"(123). a and b can be seen - according to Z. - as "Schema" and "Attribut". And it is f as "Urteilsfunktör" which creates the sentence. E.g. "verb" and "predicate" may not be confused: "Die Lexikoneinheit ist als das Exemplar einer Wortart auf die Struktur des Satzes hin zwar formiert; bei ihrer Verwendung als Satz aber tritt ein zusätzliches Formmoment hinzu, das im Lexikon nicht darstellbar ist. Das Verb ist bestimmt, Prädikatsschema; aber erst als *finites* Verb fungiert es im Satz als Prädikatsschema"(127).

¹⁸ MENNE, A (1980) 38: "Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis besteht weitgehend in Urteilen. Urteilen aber besteht darin, sich unter einer Mehrheit von möglichen Aussagen für eine zu entscheiden. Entscheiden aber setzt Unterscheiden voraus."

Predication-model ¹⁹

static vs. dynamic

autonomous vs. relational

quantitative vs. qualitative fientic vs. initiative

pertinence vs. circumstantial

specification|identity|classification|allocation

locative vs. temporal

Therefore, it would be correct to say that a notion becomes a *subject a* only if *function f* is added. This function is the reason why we are now in front of a statement. But logically, *function f* only exists, because there is a *content b*. *Function f* - as we saw it - gets its specification out of the comparison of notion *a* and notion *b*.²⁰ But without *function f*, content *b* remains a separate content and plays no part in a statement.

Therefore, despite the fact that in linguistic reality we cannot always separate *function f* and content *b*, we only have to give the

¹⁹ I got a very important suggestion by LYONS, J (1978) 469-484. His list of predicative structures is still deficient in several respects. But his ideas point into the direction I followed further. Cf. his list of sentence schemata (469s) :

- (1) NP+V (intransitive)
- (2) NP+V+NP (transitive)
- (3) NP(+Cop)+NP (equative)
- (4) NP(+Cop)+N/A (ascriptive)
- (5) NP(+Cop)+Loc (locative)
- (6) NP(+Cop)+Poss (possessive)...

NP=noun-phrase..., V=verb, Cop=copula, N=noun, A=adjective, Loc=locative (adverbial) expression, Poss=possessive (adverbial) expression". - In addition cf. STROMBACH, W (1970) 24-42. EISENBERG, P (1986) 31f subdivides declarative sentences as follows: If they are static ("Zustand") they express either a property ("Eigenschaft") or a place ("Lokalität"); if they are dynamic ("Vorgang") they express either an event ("Ereignis") or an action ("Handlung"). That, too, is a small predication-model. But the distinctions do not yet suffice.

²⁰ "In einem Urteil wird etwas mit etwas...verbunden; nur die Art dieser Verbindung ist bei den singulären, universalen und partikulären Urteilen verschieden, TUGENDHAT,WOLF (1983) 80.

term *predicate* to the *function* f .²¹ In the case of nominal sentences, we see the consequences very clearly: The kind of relation (f) can be described separately, i.e. as the real *predicate*, apart from the two nominals.²²

5. Application

Some examples

- If I say: "the scholars are numerous", then, we have the content $a = \textit{scholars}$ and content $b = \textit{numerous}$. The statement is a *quantitative* statement ($=f$). But we only have one substantial content ($=a$) whereas the other is a non-substantial description.²³ Therefore, we say that the statement is characterized by an autonomous content ($=a$), whose propositional description is added by a non-autonomous second element of content expressing a quantitative specification.

²¹ Cf. TUGENDHAT,WOLF (1983) 83: "Manchmal wird diese neue Auffassung auch so dargestellt: in Wirklichkeit sei der Relationsausdruck das Prädikat; wir haben es dann mit einem zweistelligen Prädikat zu tun, das ergänzt werden muß durch nicht nur einen Subjektausdruck, sondern ein geordnetes Paar von Subjektausdrücken". Our solution follows this insights, which have been initiated by FREGE. TUGENDHAT,WOLF remain reserved - only on didactic and terminological reasons. As for the arguments, they follow FREGE, too.

²² "Worte und Wortgruppen haben auch eignen Sinn und Bedeutung; sie sind sprachliche Symbole für Vorstellungen und deren Verbindungen. Aber Vorstellungssymbole sind weder für sich allein noch miteinander verbunden selbst schon wirkliche Sprache, sondern nur Bausteine derselben. Zur wirklich gebrauchten Sprache werden sie erst *im Satz, als Satz*", RIES, J (1931) 60.

²³ In other words: We are confronted with the combination of a *categorematic* and a *syncategorematic* meaning: "Kategorematische oder vollständige oder selbständige Bedeutung hat ein Ausdruck, der auch ohne Bezug auf einen anderen Ausdruck voll verstanden werden kann, unbeschadet dessen, daß er einer weiteren Erläuterung oder Spezifizierung fähig ist" (e.g. individuals, objects, universals, facts); "Synkategorematische oder unvollständige oder unselbständige Bedeutung hat ein Ausdruck, der auf einen anderen Ausdruck bezogen ist, erst im Zusammenhang mit einem anderen Ausdruck voll verstanden werden kann" (e.g. the copula "be"; verbs; adjectives; conjunctions; prepositions; article; adverbs): MENNE, A (1980) 46-51.

- You have the same form of relation (=f) in the case of: "the grass is green" = qualitative predication.

In the frame of static predications we have different elementary constructions under the headline "relational": Here always two separate and substantial contents enter into a relation to each other. And the quality of that relation depends on the quality of the actual substantial contents.

- If I speak - on the level of wordgroups - of the "University of Tübingen", then, we have two entities:

content a = university. You certainly agree in saying that the University is only one part of the city of Tübingen;

content b = Tübingen as a city near Stuttgart, southern Germany.

When describing this wordgroup "University of Tübingen" as a complex unity, we have to say that we are confronted with the relation of "specification". The predicate, the *function f*, is that of specification. The first element of this complex unity is only one part of the other element. The relation is inalienable, you cannot take away the university from the city. A truth, at least, since more than 500 years.

- But if you²⁴ say: "Donald Duck for President", you have - on the phrase-level - two entities, too.²⁵

the first (content a) is Donald Duck;

the second: President.

²⁴ The preposition ׀ן in Hebrew is ambivalent. It may stand for a specification (x as part of y), e.g. 1 Sam 7,14 הַצֵּל שְׁרָאֵל מִיָּד ׀ן מִשְׁפָּטֵי (metaphor). But in other contexts ׀ן may have a locative sense, e.g. Ps 40,3: ׀ן מִבֶּטֶן מְבֹרָךְ (metaphor): Here the combination of the last two words (even without the preposition) forms the relation of specification. That the preposition in itself is ambiguous is indicated by those cases where "from" indicates a relation which is "alienable", e.g. δὺο ἐξ αὐτῶν in Luke 24,13: We are confronted with an "allocation".

²⁵ Please remark that we remain here on the level of literary fiction. We do not ask according to an ontological sense (e.g. the entity "President" does not exist apart from any person). Here we aim at a description of language - not of the reality outside of it.

The relation between the two entities is of an other kind than in the previous example. Now, it is imaginable that the two entities are separated. There is no logical (and political) constraint that Donald Duck must be President. Therefore, in saying "Donald Duck for President", you want to combine two entities usually regarded as distinct. This is the relation ($= f$) of "allocation".

- A small welsh town regards itself as the center of the universe. This town is unique; the universe cannot have several centers. Therefore, two definite, unique entities are identified by saying: "This town is the center of the universe". We are confronted with the relation of "identification".²⁶

- If you look at the temple of Jerusalem, not its remains only but at the temple itself - by the aid of a model, by imagination, by the help of archeology, then you will see a specific building which has analogies in the Ancient Near East. By saying: "This building is a (near-eastern) temple", we mean that Solomon's temple of Jerusalem has been one example of the class of temples known in ancient times in that region. Accordingly, we consider the relation of "classification" as predicate ($=f$) between the content a (definite) and b (indefinite).

No fundamental differences exist in the case of deictic expressions in the position of content b : "The airport is in the plain" ($=$ locative); "the AIBI-Conference is in June" ($=$ temporal).²⁷

²⁶ It is another problem to see that many cities and towns during history preferred to regard themselves as "center of the universe". Jerusalem, too, where we are staying at the moment.
- MENNE, A (1980) 66: "Identität liegt vor, wenn zwei Namen n und n dasselbe Individuum a bedeuten".

²⁷ Two points are important in all these cases: (a) We always have to deal with a sort of the predicate "be" - which in itself is totally ambiguous. - (b) Even in the last cases of a deictic predication we refer to predications, which contain two contents a, b regarded and presented as nominals.

The *dynamic* predicates are rather simple:²⁸

- "fientic" means processes which flow without the participation of a will (will of an animal, man or god): "The river flows".

- On the other hand, "initiative" refers to dynamic actions under participation of a will: "Man bites dog". This logical structure will help us to explain phenomena of content on these levels:

semantics

- adjuncts: a lexeme within an illocution-unit²⁹ has been expanded for the sake of a higher degree of descriptive force (= the case of nominal word-groups);

- phrase: the combination of subject and predicate (= the case of a phrastic illocution-unit or of a proposition);

²⁸ But remark, that we abstain from using such well-known oppositions as: active vs. passive; transitive vs. intransitive. Both have no place in the predication-model. The active/passive-diathesis has its function in the field of *pragmatics*, or more precisely: The opposition allows to change the Thema of the text (in opposition to the Rhema), or in another terminology: topic/comment; cf. SCHWEIZER, H (1986) 101-106; transitive vs. intransitive is a insufficient formulation of the problem of actants.

²⁹ "illocution-unit" \triangleq "Äußerungseinheit" designates the unities of spoken language defined by acts of speech and not any longer - only - by the logical relations within a sentence alone (that would be the old question: What is the definition of a sentence?). cf. SCHWEIZER, H (1986BTV) 38f for definition and criteria. Therefore, we have illocution-units in two forms: phrastic (\triangleq sentences) and aphrastic (e.g. interjection, vocative). - Already J. RIES (1931) shows that we are confronted with two aspects asking: What is a sentence? "Ein Satz ist eine nicht weiter gleichartig zerlegbare Einheit der lebendigen Rede oder kurz: eine kleinste Redeeinheit" (62). That is the aspect of the utterance and not that of formal logic. And: "Die dem Satz eigene, nur ihm allein, aber auch jedem Satz eigne Leistung besteht in der Herstellung einer Beziehung zwischen seinem Inhalt und der Tatsächlichkeit der Außenwelt" (74). That is the aspect of semantics and that of logical relations. Using the term "illocution-unit", we refer to all sorts of utterances; using "phrase" or "sentence" we refer to only one part of the class of utterances.

pragmatics

- textgrammar: the relation of an illocution-unit to another illocution-unit - both understood in a literal sense; (= the case of complex phrases, of macro-sentences);
- textlinguistics: the relation between illocution-units now contextually understood with all their connotations which are at hand by observable indications or remarkable constructions in the literal context (= case of stylistic features, of indirect speech-acts);
- textlinguistics: in respect to nominal lexemes it can be critically analysed whether they really represent a distinct entity in the real world (e.g. "hand" only designates a "specification" whose correspondent member still has to be named: the man whose hand I am speaking of).
- textpragmatics: by way of implications, each text refers to informations which are not being explicitly expressed (neither in a direct nor in a stylistic hidden sense). Often it is possible to describe the intrusions coming from communication-event or being necessary for the understanding of the text (...the case of ellipses, cancelling of logically required elements).

6. Computer-software

Description of the menu-program JOSEPH.

7. Demonstration

-Demonstration of the program on a PC, application of the predication-model to the text of the JOSEPH-story showing examples on the different methodic levels (see above).

-Examples (all from the book of Genesis)

*Semantics*³⁰

³⁰ Interpretation of content: the expressions are understood as literal as possible; each illocution-unit is regarded in itself, cf. SCHWEIZER, H (1981) 80ff; (1986) 52ff.176ff.

ADJUNCTS/³¹ static-qualitative:

וּבַסֵּל הָעֶלְיוֹן 40,17a und im obersten Korb

adjuncts/ static-quantitative:

בְּלַיְלָה אֶחָד 40,5a in einer einzigen Nacht

adjuncts/ static-specification:

רֹאשִׁי 40,17b (auf) meinem Kopf

שֵׁר הַמְּשָׁקִים 40,2a dem Obersten der Mundschenken

שְׁנֵי כָּעֵב 41,27c Jahre von Hungersnot

מַעֲשֵׂה אֶפְהָה... מְכַל... 40,17a Backwerk...
von der Gesamtheit...

כַּף פַּרְעֹה 40,11d die Hand des PHARAO

חֲלֹמוֹ 40,5a seinen Traum

adjuncts/ static-identity:

עוֹד שְׁלֹשָׁת יָמִים 40,19a Verlauf von drei Tagen

שְׁנֵיהֶם 40,5a sie beide

כֹּל מְאָכַל... 40,17a ...Gesamtheit der Nahrung...

adjuncts/ static-classification:

נַעַר עִבְרִי עֹבֵד לְשֵׁר 41,12a ein hebräischer junger Mann,
ein Sklave für den Obersten

adjuncts/ static-allocation:

כּוֹס פַּרְעֹה 40,11c den Becher des PHARAO

adjuncts/ static-locative:

חֹעֵה בַּשָּׂדֶה 37,15b ein Umherirrender auf dem Feld

adjuncts/ static-temporal:

בֶּן־שֶׁבַע־עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה 37,2b ein Sohn von 17 Jahren

adjuncts/ dynamic-fientic:

יוֹם הַלְּדָת 40,20a dem Tag des Geborenwerdens

adjuncts/ dynamic-initiative:

בֵּית הַסְּהָר 39,20b ins Haus der Einschließung

³¹ Description of semantic relations within wordgroups, cf. SCHWEIZER, H (1981) 161ff; (1986) 65ff.

PREDICATION/³² static-qualitative:

| | | |
|-------------------|--------|--|
| וְיִטֵּב הַדָּבָר | 41,37a | und war gut das Wort... |
| אֱלֹהִים זָךְנָךְ | 43,29g | GOTT sei ... gnädig |
| וְהִיא כִּפְנֵחַח | 40,10b | und er () wie ein Blühender ³³ |
| שֶׁכֶּלְמִי | 43,14e | werde ich kinderlos sein |

predication/ static-quantitative:

| | | |
|-------------------------------|--------|----------------------|
| ... שְׁנַיִם-עָשָׂר אֲנַחְנוּ | 42,32a | zwei zehn () wir... |
|-------------------------------|--------|----------------------|

predication/ static-specification:

| | | |
|--------------------------|-------|---------------------------|
| ... לְאֱלֹהִים פְּתוּרֵי | 40,8e | ...GOTTES () ein Deuten? |
|--------------------------|-------|---------------------------|

predication/ static-identity:

| | | |
|----------------------|--------|-------------------------|
| שְׁלֹשָׁת יָמִים הֵם | 40,12d | drei Tage () sie |
| זֶה פְּתוּרָו | 40,12b | das () seine Bedeutung |

predication/ static-classification:

| | | |
|---------------------------------|--------|--|
| ... וְהַעוֹף אֲכָל אֹתָם מִנֵּי | 40,17b | und die Vogelschar () eine Fressende sie aus... |
| ... אֲשֶׁר אֶסְוֵרִים | 40,5d | die () Gebundene... |

predication/ static-allocation:

| | | |
|---------------------------|-------|-------------------------------|
| אֲשֶׁר לְמֶלֶךְ מִצְרַיִם | 40,5c | die () dem König von ÄGYPTEN |
|---------------------------|-------|-------------------------------|

predication/ static-locative:

| | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|
| גִּפְּו לְפָנַי | 40,9e | ein Weinstock () vor mir |
| וּבֶסֶל הָעֲלִיוֹן ... מַעֲשֵׂה אֶפֶה | 40,17a | und im obersten Korb () ...Backwerk |

predication/ static-temporal:

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|
| וְנִהְיָ אַחַר הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה | 40,1a | und es war nach diesen Sachverhalten |
| ... וְנִהְיָ בַיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי | 40,20a | und es war am dritten Tag... |

predication/ dynamic-fientic:

| | | |
|-------------------------------|--------|------------------------------------|
| וְנִחְלְמוּ חִלּוֹם שְׁנֵיהֶם | 40,5a | und träumten einen Traum sie beide |
| וְנִשְׁכַּחַהוּ | 40,23b | und er vergaß ihn |

³² Contextfree analysis of phrastic illocution-units, especially of the basic relation between 1. actant and predicate (further elements of a predication are neglected here), cf. SCHWEIZER, H (1981) 110ff; (1986) 49f.53ff.180ff. Further illustrations on psalm 46: (1986ThQ).

³³ "to be like" is regarded as second content. It is not a nominal (which would pretend to point to a separate entity). Therefore, function f has an "autonomous" character. That is the sufficient explanation according to the formula $f(a,b)$. It is not disturbing to see that there is just another nominal: a is ($\triangleleft f$) like ($\triangleleft b$) c . We have to say, that c is second actant within the predication $f(a,b)$, dependent on b .

| | | | |
|---|--------|-------------------------------|--|
| עֲלָתָהּ נֹצָה | 40,10c | heraufwuchs eine Blüte | |
| הַבָּשִׁילֹו אֲשֶׁכְּלֹתֶיהָ עָנְבִים | 40,10d | seine Trauben reiften (zu) | Bee- ren |
| predication/ dynamic-initiative: | | | |
| וַיַּעַשׂ מִשְׁתָּהּ לְכָל-עַבְדָּיו | 40,20b | und er veranstaltete ein | Gastmahl für die Gesamtheit seiner Diener |
| וַיִּתֵּן אֶת-הַכּוֹס עַל-כַּף פַּרְעֹה | 40,11d | und ich gab den Becher in die | Hand des PHARAO |
| וַיָּבִיאוּ אֵת-הַכּוֹס עַל-כַּף פַּרְעֹה | 40,4a | und brachte der Oberste... | |

*Pragmatics*³⁴TEXTGRAMMAR:³⁵ illocution-units/ static-qualitative:וַאֲנִי 43,14c und ich³⁶

כַּאֲשֶׁר שְׂכֵלְמִי 43,14d so wie ich kinderlos war

textgrammar: illocution-units/ static-quantitative:

textgrammar: illocution-units/ static-specification:

שְׁלֹשָׁה סְלִי חֲרִי עַל-רֹאשִׁי 40,16f drei Körbe von Weißbrot () auf
meinem Kopf

³⁴ The following tripartite subdivision of pragmatics is new in SCHWEIZER, H (1986) 78ff compared with (1981).

³⁵ All pronouns have to be replaced by the expressions they point to. Of course, we always have the relation of "identity" between pronoun and related expressions. We take this as a heuristic feature which shows us, which textgrammatical function these expressions have, namely the same function as the pronoun in the field of semantics. If the pronoun in a sentence has the subject-position ("that is the truth"), the sentences, the pronoun points to, have subject-function, too - now in a textgrammatical sense. If the pronoun has the function of an adjunct ("give me that book!"), the related sentence ("...which I spoke of") also has the function of an adjunct. - What we want to stress here is the complementary aspect: What does such a relation predicate? What is the new information considered within the frame of the predication-model? - Therefore, when describing the relation between illocution-units, we still need - besides the predication-model - further elements of the terminology known out of semantics; cf. SCHWEIZER, H (1986) 82ff.

³⁶ The aphrastic illocution-unit only introduces the father ISRAEL by pronoun. By conjunction, 14d is separated from 14c. Both illocution-units together form one textgrammatical sentence. The reason for the splitting of one predication into two semantic illocution-units is to be seen in emphatic speech. - For a complete description we still would have to replace the pronoun and to draw the connection to the illocution-unit, where the complete information is to be found.

40,17a und im obersten Korb () von der Gesamtheit der Nahrung des PHARAO Backwerk³⁷
 מְעֵשֶׂה אֶפֶה

textgrammar: illocution-units/ static-identity:

40,13b und er wird dich einsetzen wieder in dein Amt³⁸
 וְהִשְׂיִבְךָ עַל-כִּנְיָךְ

40,13c und du wirst geben den Becher des PHARAO in seine Hand nach früherer Gewohnheit
 וְנָתַתָּ כּוֹס־פַּרְעֹה בְּיָדוֹ כַּמִּשְׁפָּט הַקָּדָשׁוֹר

textgrammar: illocution-units/ static-classification:

(I)³⁹

40,5b der Mundschenk und der Bäcker
 הַמְשָׁקָה וְהָאֶפֶה

[]

40,5d die () Gebundene im Haus der Einschließung
 אֲשֶׁר אֶסְוִינִים בְּבַיִת הַסֹּהַר

(II)

40,5b der Mundschenk und der Bäcker
 הַמְשָׁקָה וְהָאֶפֶה

[]

40,6c und genau sie () Verdrossene
 וְהֵנָּם זֹעֲפִים

textgrammar: illocution-units/ static-allocation:

40,5b der Mundschenk und der Bäcker
 הַמְשָׁקָה וְהָאֶפֶה

[]

40,5c die () dem König von ÄGYPTEN
 אֲשֶׁר לְמֶלֶךְ מִצְרַיִם

textgrammar: illocution-units/ static-locative:

(I)

41,36a und wird werden die Speise zu
 וְהָיָה הָאֶכֶל לְפִקְדוֹן לְאֶרֶץ

Vorrat für das Land für die sieben Jahre der Hungersnot
 לְשִׁבַע שָׁנֵי הָרָעָב

41,36b die sein werden im ÄGYPTENland
 אֲשֶׁר תִּהְיֶינָה בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם

³⁷ 17a describes only a part of the complex unity of 16f. The repetition of קל is an important indicator of the relation.

³⁸ The last noun of 13b is a summary (like all abstract nouns); 13c interprets 13b; therefore both illocution-units are identical. As a link we could imagine between them an *i.e.* The threefold reference to the 2nd person is a helpful indicator of the relation.

³⁹ The semantically aphrastic illocution-unit 40,5b is in a contextual sense the starting-point of several textgrammatical sentences. Three are mentioned here. In each case pronouns indicate the relation.

(II)⁴⁰

| | | |
|---|--------|--|
| בְּחִלּוּמִי | 40,9c | in meinem Traum |
| וְהִנֵּה- | 40,9d | und da |
| גִּפְּוֹ לְפָנַי | 40,9e | ein Weinstock () vor mir |
| וּבְגִפְּוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה שְׁרִיגִים | 40,10a | und an dem Weinstock () drei Weinranken |
| וְהָיָא כְּפֹרֶחַח | 40,10b | und er () wie ein Blühender |
| עָלְתָה נֹצָה | 40,10c | herauskam eine Blüte |
| הַבְּשִׁילוֹ אֲשֶׁכְּלֹתֶיהָ עֲנָבִים | 40,10d | seine Trauben reiften (zu) Beeren |
| וְכֹוס פְּרֹעָה בְּיָדִי | 40,11a | und der Becher des PHARAO () in meiner Hand |
| וְאָקַח אֶת-הָעֲנָבִים | 40,11b | und ich nahm die Beeren |
| וְאָשַׁחט אֹתָם אֶל-כֹּוס פְּרֹעָה | 40,11c | und ich presste sie in den Becher des PHARAO |
| וְנָתַתִּי אֶת-הַכֹּוס עַל-יַד פְּרֹעָה | 40,11d | und ich gab den Becher in die Hand des PHARAO |

textgrammar: illocution-units/ static-temporal:

(I)⁴¹

| | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| כִּי-זֶה שְׁנַתִּים הִרְעָב בְּקֶרֶב | 45,6a | denn | schon |
| | | | zwei Jahre die Hungersnot () |
| הָאָרֶץ | | | in der Mitte des Landes |
| וְעוֹד חֲמֵשׁ שָׁנִים | 45,6b | und noch fünf Jahre | |
| אֲשֶׁר אֵינֶנּוּ-רִישׁ וְקָצִיר | 45,6c | in denen Nicht-Existenz | |
| | | | von Pflügzeit und Ernte |

(II)⁴²

| | | |
|--|-------|--|
| וַיְהִי אַחֲרַי הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה | 40,1a | und <u>es</u> war nach diesen Sachverhalten |
| וְהַמְּשָׁקֵה מִלְכֵי-מִצְרַיִם | 40,1b | verfehlten sich (immer wieder) |
| וְהָאֹפֶה לְאֲדֹנָיָהֶם לְמַלְכוּת מִצְרַיִם | | der Mundschenk des Königs von ÄGYPTEN und der Bäcker gegen ihren Herrn, gegen den König von ÄGYPTEN |

⁴⁰ A nice example. According to the formula *x is located at y*, we can say, that $y = 9c$, $x = 9e-11d$. 9d marks the place where the two contents of the predication - remember: $f(a,b)$ - meet each other. 9c is a hinge (but not the predicate $f!$).

⁴¹ 6abc give *one* complex indication of the length of the famine, additionally underlined by the synonym negations in 6c.

⁴² All impersonal subjects at the beginning of a text (or paragraphe) comprise the whole following story. 40,1a gives a formulaic time-reference.

| | | |
|--|---------|--|
| [.....] | [.....] | |
| textgrammar: illocution-units/ dynamic-fientic: | | |
| וַיִּקְרָא יוֹסֵף אֶת-שְׁמֵי הַבְּכוֹרֹת | 41,51a | und rief JOSEF den Namen des |
| מְנַשֶּׁה | | Erstgeborenen MANASSE |
| כִּי- | 41,51b | denn ⁴³ |
| וַיִּשְׁכַּח אֶת-כָּל-עֲמָלִי | 41,51c | GOTT hat mich vergessen lassen |
| וְאֵת כָּל-בְּיַחַד אֲבִי | | die Gesamtheit meiner Mühsal und die Gesamtheit meines Vaterhauses |
| textgrammar: illocution-units/ dynamic-initiative: | | |
| (I) ⁴⁴ | | |
| זֶה פְּתָרְנוֹ | 40,12b | das () seine Bedeutung |
| שְׁלֹשׁ הַשָּׂרָגִים | 40,12c | die drei Weinranken |
| שְׁלֹשׁ יָמִים הֵם | 40,12d | drei Tage () sie |
| בְּעוֹד שְׁלֹשׁ יָמִים יִשָּׂא פָרְעֹה | 40,13a | im Verlauf von drei Tagen erheben |
| אֶת-רֹאשׁוֹ | | wird der PHARAO dein Haupt |
| וְיִשְׂבֹּר עַל-כִּנּוֹ | 40,13b | und er wird dich einsetzen wieder in dein |
| | | Amt |
| וְנָתַתָּ כּוֹס-פָּרְעֹה בְּיָדוֹ כַּמִּשְׁפֹּט | 40,13c | und du wirst geben den Becher des |
| הַרְאֵשׁוֹ | | PHARAO in seine Hand nach früherer Gewohnheit |
| אֲשֶׁר הָיִיתָ מְשֻׁקֵּהוּ | 40,13d | als du warst sein Mundschenk |
| (II) ⁴⁵ | | |
| אֲנִי יוֹסֵף אָחִיכֶם | 45,4e | ich () JOSEF, euer Bruder |
| אֲשֶׁר- | 45,4f | von dem gilt |

⁴³ Anew we have a hinge between the two essential parts of the textgrammatical sentence. 51c points to a process, which justifies the proper name MANASSE.

⁴⁴ The nominal-static זֶה in 12b gets a very dynamic-initiative content by 12c-13d. At this textgrammatical level pronouns force us/the reader to seek the respective complete information.

⁴⁵ Semantically 4e is an "identification". To this static predication the context adds a dynamic-initiative understanding of JOSEF.

מְכַרְתֶּם אֹתִי מִצְרָיִמָה 45,4g ihr habt verkauft mich nach
ÄGYPTEN

TEXTLINGUISTICS:⁴⁶ ILLOCUTION-UNITS/⁴⁷ static-qualitative:⁴⁸

textlinguistics: illocution-units/ static-quantitative:

textlinguistics: illocution-units/ static-specification:

וַיַּעַשׂ מִשְׁחָה לְכָל-עַבְדָּיו 40,20b und er veranstaltete ein
Gastmahl für die Gesamtheit
seiner Diener

This sentence is specified by the following
illocution-units.⁴⁹

וַיִּשָּׂא אֶחָד־רֵאשׁ שֵׁר הַמְּשָׁקִים 40,20c und er erhob das Haupt des
Ober-

וַאֲחֵר־רֵאשׁ שֵׁר הָאֲפִים בְּחֹרֶף
sten der Mundschenken und
das

עַבְדָּיו
Haupt des Obersten der Bäcker
inmitten seiner Diener

וַיִּשֶׁב אֶחָד־שֵׁר הַמְּשָׁקִים 40,21a und setzte er wieder ein
עַל-מְשָׁקָהוּ den Obersten der Mundschenken in
sein Schenkenamt

וַיִּתֵּן הַכּוֹס עַל-כַּף פַּרְעֹה 40,21b und er gab den Becher in die
Hand des PHARAO

⁴⁶ The measure of interpretation increases. On the level of textgrammar we referred to the literal sense, to explicit textual helps (pronouns), to our every-day-knowledge. As against that, we now have to consider the context more critically: stylistic features have to be analysed, artificial lexemes (such as abstract nouns) are reduced to the underlying predication. Thereby, the lacking but necessary informations can be seen, the context must be interpreted from a greater distance to see functions of a passage not explicitly indicated in the text, but plausible in the ductus of it; cf. SCHWEIZER, H (1986) 89ff.

⁴⁷ For this kind of question cf. SCHWEIZER, H (1986) 96f.

⁴⁸ It is only a question of time, not a question of theory, that several of the following categories remain without example. That is the price for being dean of the faculty...

⁴⁹ The interpretation may be based on previous informations in this chapter: JOSEF predicted it. Whilst we would not have difficulties to interpret 20c.21a in the frame of a מִשְׁחָה based only on our every-day-knowledge, we would have great difficulties to identify the unexpected action of 22a as part of the feast... Therefore, it is not our every-day-knowledge alone which - at first hand - leads our interpretations but the (unexpected) indications explicitly given by the text itself.

textlinguistics: illocution-units/ static-identity:

40,14a אָמַרְתְּ אִתִּי אֶל-פְּרָעָה and 14d וְהִזְכַּרְתְּ אֵל-פְּרָעָה and 14e
 הָיָה לְךָ מִן-הַבַּיִת הַזֶּה
 וְעָשִׂיתְּ אִתִּי אֶת-הַדָּבָר
 הַזֶּה "und mache doch mit mir Wohlwollen" So far, 14b
 on the one side and 14ade on the other are identical.

textlinguistics: illocution-units/ static-classification:

textlinguistics: illocution-units/ static-allocation:

textlinguistics: illocution-units/ static-locative:

textlinguistics: illocution-units/ static-temporal:

textlinguistics: illocution-units/ dynamic-fientic:

textlinguistics: illocution-units/ dynamic-initiative:

TEXTLINGUISTICS: NOMINAL LEXEMES/ static-qualitative:

(I) (a seemingly referring) noun => static-qualitative

וְעָשִׂיתְּ אִתִּי אֶת-הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה 40,14c "und mache doch mit mir
 Wohlwollen"

Only actions can be ordered. Therefore, 14c seems to speak of a dynamic-initiative reality. But וְעָשִׂיתְּ is nothing which can be made, produced, and ordered by will. It is a feeling, an inner relation between two human beings. It is not an object - neither in the real world nor in a grammatical sense. This shows that we are confronted with stylistic features. The sentence has to be translated into a language, which does not offer such problems. So we decipher the seemingly product of actions (=dynamic-initiative) as a static-qualitative (inner) relation, not as a separate entity (=noun) but as a (psychic) part, quality, feeling of an individual.⁵⁰

(II) (a seemingly referring) noun => static-qualitative⁵¹

⁵⁰ Certainly, such a feeling, psychic relation is directed to a second individual. But firstly we are describing the structure of *one* individual. In this primary sense, such a quality (containing an inner relation) is not the same as the relation of *allocation*.

⁵¹ Cf. SCHWEIZER, H (1981) 228ff; (1986) 94f. A modification is necessary: In both books nouns which refer to a real object or individual have been registered under *static-qualitative*. Obviously that is wrong. We have to take the next higher knot in the tree of the predication-model: static-autonomous, *before* such a real entity is divided in the aspects of quantity or quality.

בְּיָצֵק "bezüglich der Hässlichkeit" (41,19d) - on the morphological level we have to do with a normal noun (see the construction with preposition). Semantically that means: That is a referring noun, pointing to an object in the extra-linguistic world. But now we detect, that the noun only designates a quality of any object.

textlinguistics: nominal lexemes/ static-quantitative:

(a seemingly referring) noun => static-quantitative

Hebrew treats כָּל (39,3c) "und die Gesamtheit" as noun on the morphological level. And as such a (abstract) noun the word easily can be translated. Therefore, it should not be taken as a simple quantifier. But now, we have to reduce the noun to its very function: It does not designate an object, but only the quantitative aspect of objects.

textlinguistics: nominal lexemes/ static-specification:

(I) noun (referring to a whole object) => specification (x is only part of y)

עַל (43,3c) "mein Gesicht": In each language parts of a complex entity can be treated as if they were separate entities. But the present methodological level in our analysis wants to detect such an artificial use of the language. The example cited informs us via pronoun about the "owner" of the face.⁵²

(II) noun (referring to a whole object) => specification (x is only part of y)

בְּיָדְךָ (43,12a) "in eure Hand"

textlinguistics: nominal lexemes/ static-identity:

פַּרְעֹה (39,1b) "PHARAO" points to a specific and unique person because in normal times there could only be one pharao in Egypt synchronically. But at the same time we know, that "pharao" is a sort of title, function. The word tells us nothing about the individuality: Who is that person? We need some more information because we are confronted with an identification (x = y) and at the moment only *one* part is known to us.

⁵² The quotation-marks are necessary: In the case of an "allocation" it is possible to speak of an "owner" because then the relation between the two contents is "alienable" whereas the relation of a "specification" is "inalienable".

textlinguistics: nominal lexemes/ static-classification:

(I) (a seemingly referring) noun => classification

40,2a שֵׁר הַאֲוֹפִים ... שֵׁר הַמְשֻׁקִים seem to point in a direct sense to individuals. In reality, individuals are classified by these expressions.

(II) (a seemingly referring) noun => classification

וְנֶקֶף (43,12a) "und Silber": The noun is a collective of all objects consisting of silver.

textlinguistics: nominal lexemes/ static-allocation:

(I) noun (pointing to an individual person) => static-allocation

עַבְדִּי (41,12a) "ein Sklave": This word gives more information than only the reference to an individual person. It expresses an hierarchic *relation* between two persons. Therefore, we need a further information (who is that person x that dominates our person y?). So it is necessary to question whether the literary context (\cong textlinguistics) gives that information, or the situation of communication (\cong textpragmatics).

(II) noun (pointing to an individual person) => static-allocation

...אָבִי (43,2d) "Vater" does not only point to a person, but the word additionally designates a biological relationship. It is due to this internal structure that the word leads to the question: "Father of whom?" We begin to seek firstly in the literary context whether we get that information. In our case the task is not too difficult: אָבִי "ihr" is a first indicator; but the pronoun still has to be replaced by the respective complete information.

textlinguistics: nominal lexemes/ static-locative:

textlinguistics: nominal lexemes/ static-temporal:

textlinguistics: nominal lexemes/ dynamic-fientic:

noun in temporal sense⁵³ => dynamic-fientic

בְּרִאֲוֵיהֶן (39,13a) "bei ihrem Sehen"

textlinguistics: nominal lexemes/ dynamic-initiative:

(I) (a seemingly referring) noun => dynamic-initiative

In 40,3b אִינְדִּיבִדּוּדִי seems to point to an individual in the extraneous, extra-linguistic world, but a

⁵³ Such a description contains two basic semantical insights: (a) The noun is taken in its seemingly normal function (to be related with an object of the real world). (b) We notice the function the noun in the actual illocution-unit has.

dynamic-initiative predication is hidden: X has captured and bound JOSEF when?, where?, how?

(II) noun in locative sense => dynamic-initiative

The שְׁנֵי קָרִיקָיו שֶׁר הִטְבְּחִים paid attention to the שֶׁר הִטְבְּחִים הָאוֹפִים: He controlled them, gave orders - when?, where exactly?, under what circumstances? So the locative information of 40,4c בְּמִשְׁמַר in reality means a complex of actions.

(III) noun in locative sense => dynamic-initiative

עַד-בֹּא (39,16a) "bis zum Kommen"

TEXTPRAGMATICS/⁵⁴ static-qualitative:

textpragmatics/ static-quantitative:

וַיִּפְתַּח יוֹסֵף אֶחָד-כָּל- 41,56b und öffnete JOSEF die Gesamtheit

אֲשֶׁר 41,56c die

בָּהֶם 41,56d in ihnen

What did JOSEF open? On the level of semantics we took כָּל as noun; at the level of textlinguistics we must say, that the noun in reality is only a quantifier. But now - logically - the question arises: Whose quantity? The text gives no information - because of a very excited speech. But the question remains and the answer will be given by the extratextual own imagination: "barns, stocks".

textpragmatics/ static-specification:

textpragmatics/ static-identity:

פַּרְעֹה (41,10a) "PHARAO" - we saw at *textlinguistics/nominal lexemes* that this word has to be understood as an "identity". This logical relation requires two contents - even if both are referentially identical. But the text does not give us the second content. He does not tell us *who* is the pharao. And we are not able to fill in that information by external

⁵⁴ At this stage we are leaving the given text after having it described rather exhaustively. But it is normal that some informations have to be infilled by the reader of the text, wether he uses other texts, his every-day-knowledge, scientific information or his own phantasy. No text gives all informations necessary for his understanding.

sources. - That is one important reason, why the JOSEF-story has no great historical value.⁵⁵

textpragmatics/ static-classification:

textpragmatics/ static-allocation:

textpragmatics/ static-locative:

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| <p>וַיִּתֵּן אֹתָם בְּמִשְׁמַר בַּיִת שֶׁר</p> <p>הַטְּבָחִים אֶל-בַּיִת הַסֵּהַר מְקוֹם</p> <p>אֲשֶׁר</p> <p>לְיוֹסֵף אֲסוּר שָׁם</p> | <p>40,3a</p> <p>40,3b</p> | <p>und er gab sie in Gewahrsam des Hauses des Obersten der Schutzwache, zum Haus der Einschließung, den Ort dessen JOSEF () ein Gebundener dort</p> |
|--|---------------------------|--|

The description of the *place*, where JOSEF has been arrested seems to be very extended - in a literal-semantic sense. Textlinguistically we are referred to *actions* instead of places: **הַטְּבָחִים ... מִשְׁמַר ... אֲסוּר ... הַסֵּהַר ...**. Therefore, we still lack precise informations where JOSEF was imprisoned. The literary context is not interested to provide the reader with such informations. So, we have to leave the text and to exploit other possible sources of information. In our case - I suppose⁵⁶ - only the own phantasy will give further informations about the prison of JOSEF...⁵⁷

textpragmatics/ static-temporal:

textpragmatics/ dynamic-fientic:

textpragmatics/ dynamic-initiative:

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⁵⁵ The high estimation of the literary and narrative structure is not touched by such an insight; cf. SCHWEIZER, H (1986) 113.
⁵⁶ Archeology did not yet find the prison where JOSEF has been arrested...
⁵⁷ There is an additional problem: The fact, that many descriptions are given, shows that the author does not presuppose the knowledge about the place where JOSEF has been imprisoned. But meanwhile we know, that the author's informations not really give answer to the question he arose. - Both aspects give the impression that we have to do with a pure fictional story. - As for the problem of implications and presuppositions cf. SCHWEIZER, H (1986) 110-113.

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